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Executive Summary
1. The paper describes the performance evaluation system for
Government-Invested Enterprises (GIEs) in Korea, and discusses its
potential applicability in other countries. Specifically, the paper
presents the recent reform measures in the public enterprise sector, and
analyzes the results of the performance evaluation of GIEs during its first
two years, 1983 and 1984. The paper also discusses the major factors of
achievements of the Korean system and its weaknesses, and finally attempts
to draw some conclusions that could be useful for other countries which may
consider adopting a similar system.
2. The public enterprise sector in Korea accounts for 9% of GDP, 7%
of total employment in the manufacturing sector, and 28% of the country's
fixed capital formation. The sector comprises some 85 corporations, which
can be classified into four categories according to the degree of
government participation in equity and intervention in management. By far
the most important of these four categories is the government-invested
enterprise, where government holds at least 50% of the equity and top
management is appointed by the Government. There are currently 25 GIEs,
which account about half of the employment, value-added, and sales of the
public enterprise sector.
3. Until recently, the performance of the GIEs was disappointing.
Their rate of return on operating capital was only 3.7% compared to 10.1%
for industry as a whole. Just a 5% improvement in the efficiency of GIEs
would free resources amounting to about 1.7% of GDP (in 1981). To boost
the efficiency of the GIEs, the Government-Invested Enterprise Management
Act was promulgated in 1984. This Act aims at introducing fundamental and
far-reaching measures designed to increase managerial autonomy and
accountability as well as establishing effective government control over
the activities of the GIEs. The most prominent reform under the new Act
was the introduction of the performance evaluation system.
4. The Korea system uses two kinds of performance indicators:
quantitative indicators which account for 70% of the final "score" of the
GIE, and qualitative indicators which account for 30%. There are a dozen
quantitative indicators, with public or private profitability as the most
important single indicator (20% weight), and 3-4 qualitative indicators,
such as long-term corporate debt management plan and quality improvement of
services to customers.
5. Notwithstanding some technical flaws (such as the problem of
duplicate indicators), the Korean performance evaluation system can be
considered to be an impressive achievement. The most important factor in
the system's success is the high degree of political commitment. This is
essentially critical in a country like Korea, where government leadership
is a major driving force for economic growth. The high receptiveness of
the managers of GIEs to the system's incentives is the second most
important factor. The pecuniary reward is an "extra bonus" determined by
the GIE's ranking: the outstanding firms receive a sum equivalent to three
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month's "extra" salary/wage, whereas the poorly performing firms get only
one month "extra" salary/wage. Even more important is the nonmaterial
incentive or sanction provided by public recognition of performance.
Public recognition is an important element in group psychology in the
culture of Korea, and exerts an immense influence on the behavior of the
Koreans. A number of other factors have also contributed to the Korean
system's success, including the relatively simple data requirements, the
pre-existing well trained manpower of GIEs, the ready disposition of
Koreans towards the relative ranking system because of their early exposure
to high competitive entrance examinations, and the flexibility in setting
enterprise-specific indicators and management objectives.
6. Four major lessons from the Korean experience for other
performance evaluation system are: (a) high level political leaders and
ministries should show a strong, consistent and high commitment to the
system; (b) at the start, the system should be simple with rather crude
indicators and limited data requirements -- the system can be gradually
refined at a later stage; (c) devising adequate "incentive" and career
development systems, based upon the results of performance evaluation, is
of critical importance; and (d) training the key officials in government
and public corporations who are responsible for running the system should
be given top priority in the reform strategy of the public enterprise
sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 Korea is one of the few countries in the world that has a system
for evaluating the performance of its public enterprises. Established in
1983, the system is enjoying great success in Korea. There are many
lessons to be learned from Korean experience, and its system appears to be
rather easily adaptable to other countries. However, very few documents
about the system are available in English. 1/ Based on a mission to Korea
during July 1985, this paper extensively describes the system. It
addresses an audience that seeks to apply or adopt the Korean system to
other countries, especially data-poor African ones. The paper is not meant
to provide a theoretical economic analysis of the system.
1.02 This paper first reviews briefly the place and role of
Government-Invested Enterprises (GIEs) in Korea, which represent by far the
most important category of public corporations. It traces the
unsatisfactory performance of GIEs, leading to the promulgation of the
Government-Invested Enterprise Management Act which introduced extensive
institutional and legal reforms. The paper then describes the system's
various characteristics and reviews the results of the evaluations
conducted for its first two operational years, 1983 and 1984. Finally, the
paper assesses the system's performance and attempts to draw some
1/ All documents (both in English and Korean) consulted for the paper are
given in the bibliography at the end of the paper.
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conclusions that will be useful for other countries which may consider
adopting a similar system.
II. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT-INVESTED ENTERPRISES
2.01 Korea is well known for its reliance on market forces, its
industrious labor force, the great energy of its private entrepreneurs, and
the pragmatism of the government's economic policies. In such an economy,
the large size of the public enterprise (PE) sector comes rather as a
surprise: in 1980, it accounted for about 9% of GDP, 7% of total
employment in the manufacturing sector, and 28% of the country's fixed
capital formation. This size reflects the government's strong commitment
to a centrally directed development strategy in critical areas and its
desire to use the PE sector as a vehicle to further achieve its various
economic objectives, including export promotion, accelerated development of
heavy industries, and wide distribution of the products of public
utilities.
2.02 The PE sector in Korea comprises some 85 enterprises which can be
classified into four categories according to the varying degrees of
government participation in ownership and its intervention in management:
- 3 -
governmental enterprises, composed of various governmental
departments such as the Office of Monopoly or Office of
Railroads;
government-invested enterprises (GIEs), where government holds at
least 50% of the equity and whose top management is appointed by
the government such as with the Korea Development Bank or the
Korea Electric Power Corporation;
subsidiary companies of GIEs, which allow the government to
invest indirectly through GIEs; and
other government-backed enterprises, where the government holds
less than 50% of the stock.
2.03 By far the most important of these enterprises are the GIEs.
They represent the core of the new enterprises established since President
Park launched his ambitious export-led growth programs in the early 1960s.
There are currently 25 GIEs, which account for 45% of the employment, 47%
of the total budget, and 43% of the sales of the PE sector. 2/ All 25 GIEs
are currently extending their activities in various subsectors--banking and
finance (5), manufacturing (5), construction, (5) and services (10)-- thus
strengthening their influence on Korea's economy.
2/ For further details of the 25 GIEs, see Annex II.
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2.04 In 1984, the combined budget of the 25 GIEs amounted to
11,270 billion won ($1.00 - 810 won). This amount exceeded the
general-account budget of the central government, whereas the total
investment in GIEs represented 17% of gross domestic investment of Korea.
In addition, GIEs have very strong forward and backward linkages, and their
prices for electricity, coal, and telephone services have a significant
bearing on overall cost and price levels. Finally, GIEs are major holders
of domestic credit and external debts: at the end of 1983, they accounted
for 24% and 56% of total external and domestic debentures, respectively.
III. THE UNSATISFACTORY LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY OF GIEs
3.01 Although the performance of GIEs compared favorably with that of
the PE sectors of most other developing countries, it was not up to the
expected level. For 1982, the rate of return of operating capital was
estimated to be only 3.7% for the GIEs, against 10.1% for industry as a
whole. Already in the late 1970's, the disappointing level of efficiency,
together with the deteriorating financial situation of GIEs and their
negative impact on public-sector resources, gave rise to rapidly growing
concern.
3.02 In the early 19809, the government-sponsored Korea Development
Institute (KDI) carried out a series of research programs on the problems
of the GIEs in Korea. In September 1981, the KDI reported its findings and
recommendations to President Chun, who expressed a keen interest in
reforming GIEs and a strong commitment to the idea of a performance
evaluation system for GIEs. The major problems underlying the poor
efficiency of GIEs were very similar to those commonly found in other
developing countries. These problems included obscure and sometimes
conflicting managerial goals, the absence of both the accountability and
autonomy of management, excessive government interference in day-to-day
management without effective control over the results, inadequate personnel
and incentive systems, complicated budget and procurement processes, and
inappropriate pricing and credit policies.
3.03 A simple calculation showed that even a slight improvement in
efficiency in GIEs could bring about substantial gains in the national
economy. For example, a 5% improvement in the real efficiency of GIEs in
Korea was estimated to free resources amounting to 1.7% of GDP, or over one
billion dollars, in 1981. 3/ Increased efficiency of GIEs therefore would
bring much-needed relief to the three key issues confronting Korea in the
early 1980s: price stabilization, external debt reduction, and freeing an
adequate amount of investment resources for the private sector.
3/ Leroy P. Jones, "Towards a Performance Evaluating Methodology for
Public Enterprises: With Special Reference to Pakistan," 1982.
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3.04 Working closely with the Economic Planning Board from March 1982
to March 1984, the KDI formulated proposals for improving the efficiency of
GIEs. The capstone of these proposals was a system for evaluating the
performance of GIEs. With the strong personal support of the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of the Economic Planning Board, the KDI undertook
several campaigns to mobilize the consensus of government, business, and
academic circles in favor of reforming the PE system, especially the
critical need for adopting supporting legislation. 4/
IV. GOVERNMENT-INVESTED ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT ACT
4.01 As a result of these efforts, the National Assembly passed the
Government-Invested Enterprise Management Act on December 16, 1983, and
promulgated the Act on December 31 of that year (Law No. 3690). On March
20, 1984, the Enforcement Decree for the Government-Invested Enterprise
Management Act was promulgated as Presidential Decree No. 11,395.
4.02 The new Act, merges two existing Acts: the Government-Invested
Administration Act and Government-Invested Enterprise Budget and Account
Act. Its objectives are: (1) increased managerial autonomy and
4/ Under the second Structural Adjustment Loan to Korea covering 1983-84,
the World Bank stated the promulgation of the Act as the key
monitorable action and conditionality for the PE reform component.
accountability, and (2) effective control. They are to be achieved by such
innovations as: 5/
1. the management by objectives (MBO) system of budget
preparation;
2. greater enterprise management control over procurement,
budgeting, and personnel policy;
3. a two-tier management organization, with the Board of
Directors as the decision-making body and the enterprise
President as chief executive in charge of implementation;
4. the simplification and unification of outside audits, and
the elimination of business supervision by technical
ministries; and
5. an objectives-oriented post-evaluation system and related
incentive systems.
A. Institutional Reforms
4.03 The Act's most important innovation by far is its evaluation
system, which determines differentiated bonuses and other rewards as well
5/ For details, see "Introduction to the Government-Invested Enterprises
Management Act," December 1984, Economic Planning Board, The Republic
of Korea.
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as penalties. This section examines the institutional and legal reforms
that became necessary to implement the Act.
4.04 Implementing the new Act required fundamental reforms both in the
government institutions dealing with GIEs and their relationships to each
other as shown in Chart I.
Chart I
Institutional Relations
The GIE Management el11
Evaluation Council
Secretariat\/
GIE The Public
Special Task Enterprise Evaluation Sectoral
Force (located Bureau in the Ministries
in KDI Economic Planning
__ 0 - ~~Board.
Ad hoc -GIEl
Management Evaluation *The arrows indicate infor-
Task Force mation flows and/or lines of
authority
4.05 GIE Management Evaluation Council: This council is the highest
authority in charge of deliberating and resolving matters related to the
overall management of GIEs. Chaired by the Minister of Economic Planning,
the Council is composed of the Minister of Finance, ten ministers of the
relevant technical ministries, and three temporary commissioners from the
private sector. 6/ As of July 31, 1985, the latter were the President of
KDI and 2 academic professors.
4.06 As outlined under Article 4, Section 2, of the Act, the Council's
main responsibilities include:
1. formulating general guidelines for preparing the
management objectives and budgets of GIEs;
2. coordinating those management objectives for the GlEs;
3. evaluating managerial performance of GIEs; and
4. dealing with other matters concerning the management of
GIEs, as determined by presidential decree.
4.07 Public Enterprise Evaluation Bureau: Located in the Ministry of
Economic Planning, this Bureau functions as a permanent secretariat to the
Management Evaluation Council and reports directly to the Chairman of the
Council. This Bureau carries out the Council's main responsibilities,
coordinates closely with other sectoral/technical ministries on the matters
concerning them, and handles all the work related to performance
evaluation. The Bureau has about twenty people on its staff, including the
Director and two division chiefs.
6/ See Article 4, (3) of the Act.
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4.08 Referred to as the busiest civil servant in Korea, the Director
of the Bureau is the Executive Secretary of the Council and also is a de
jure member of the Boards of Directors of all 25 GIEs. 7/ One of the
Bureau's most important tasks is to design and implement the performance
evaluation system for GIEs. Given the limited experience, professional
skills and knowledge of the staff, however, the Bureau has had to call on
the KDI to do the job. The Bureau also has had to rely on the ad hoc GIE
Management Evaluation Task Force, composed exclusively of nongovernment
experts, to evaluate the GIEs in 1984 and 1985, and will still do so for
1986. However, the Bureau is planning to carry out the evaluation task
with its own staff beginning in 1987.
4.09 In July 1985, the Bureau's most visible activity was revising the
Establishment Acts of individual GIEs, which should be substantially
modified in accordance with the new Act. The revisions for the 25 GIEs
should be completed by the end of 1985.
4.10 GIE Management Evaluation Ad Hoc Task Force: As mentioned above,
this Task Force actually carried out the performance evaluation over the
last two years. For the last round of 1985, the Task Force had 32 members,
including professors in economics and business administration, senior staff
7/ One of his most sensitive tasks is to convince his colleagues from
sectoral ministries to stop interfering with the day-to-day management
of GIEs that were under their direct purview until recently.
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from research institutes, businessmen, and CPAs. The Task Force was well
received by GIEs not only because of its professional expertise but also
because of its neutrality. On the average, the Task Force worked on its
assignment during April and May of 1985. Upon nomination by the Council in
April, the members of the Task Force started reviewing the "annual
performance evaluation reports" submitted by GIEs. They visited GIEs on
several occasions for further data collection and discussions with GIE
managers and planners, and gave performance scores after intensive
deliberations with government officials, GIEs officers, and their
colleagues. The Task Force reported its findings to the Council in about
mid-June.
4.11 GIE Special Task Force: One of the most visible results of the
first round of the performance evaluation exercise in 1984 was the
heightened awareness of GIEs of the impact that the evaluation system might
have on the reputation and the future of the company. This resulted in the
creation of a performance evaluation unit within most of the GIEs,
generally staffed with highly qualified personnel. In March 1985, the
government created the GIE Special Task Force to bridge the rapidly
widening gap between the government and GIEs in skill, knowledge, and
expertise on matters related to performance evaluation. The government
realized that unless it took action immediately, the negotiating power
between the two parties would be unbalanced in favor of GIEs. Moreover,
the credibility of the evaluation system relies heavily on the
professionalism of government officials in charge of the system and the
- 12 -
government's sustained efforts to tailor both qualitative and quantitative
indicators to the specifics of each GIE.
4.12 Currently composed of two KDI staff, four certified public
accountants, and ten officers from various GIEs, this Special Task Force
can in the long run be an excellent mechanism to meet the two major
needs--training of government staff and improving the indicators. For the
time being, it is concerned exclusively with improving the performance
evaluation system. There is no elaborate training program for government
staff, especially those working in the Performance Evaluation Bureau in the
Economic Planning Board. For the next two years, the Special Task Force
will focus essentially on further improving enterprise-specific indicators.
4.13 Sectoral/Technical Ministries: Before the introduction of the
present system, sectoral and technical ministries interfered with the
day-to-day management of, and sometimes provided unjustified
overprotectionist measures for, the GIEs under their purview. Among other
things, the new Act aims to eliminate--or at least substantially
reduce--this excessive interference. The Act directs those ministries
instead to devote all their energy to formulating sectoral policies to be
carried out within the nationwide framework of development strategy. This
task is to be carried out by using the sectoral ministry's seat on the
Board of Directors of GIEs to discuss and reach agreement upon the
management objectives -- the latter being an integral part of the
- 13 -
performance evaluation exercise (see Article 5, Section (2) and (3) of the
Management Act).
4.14 After two rounds of the evaluation exercise, some observers claim
that the interference of the sectoral and technical ministries has been
reduced to the minimum level and that each party is ready to play the game
according to the rules. That is, sectoral ministries will issue only
policy guidelines, and GIE management will have increased autonomy and
accountability. However, some sectoral ministries have complained that
their policy guidelines have not been properly reflected in corporate
plans, and that they now have little or no power to force GIEs to follow
their guidelines.
B. Legal Reforms
4.15 The Management Act provides the general legal framework within
which the GIEs operate. Once the Act became effective, the existing
decrees needed to be revised to reflect the new Act's general philosophy
and specific regulations. The Performance Evaluation Bureau in the
Economic Planning Board has been busily carrying out that task. By July
31, 1985, the Establishment Acts had been revised for seventeen GIEs with
the other eight revisions scheduled for completion by the end of 1985.
4.16 The principle of the autonomy of management is further reinforced
in the revised individual decrees. As a Director in the Ministry of
Telecommunications put it, all references to the words "a priori approval"
- 14 -
or "report to the Ministry" should be deleted in the revised Establishment
Acts. According to the Director of the Performance Evaluation Bureau,
there has been surprisingly limited, even mild objection from the sectoral
ministries to this policy. For an outsider, this comes as rather a
surprise since legal reform generally constitutes one of the most
complicated and politically sensitive operations; for example, this is the
case in many African countries, which are strongly tilted toward a very
French legalistic attitude.
4.17 Two factors may possibly explain this acceptance. One is the
high commitment of the President of the Republic of Korea to the evaluation
system and the elimination of a priori government control over GIEs.
Therefore, all ministries understand immediately that there is no room for
possible power games between various ministries. Another factor is the
general climate in Korea in favor of the accelerated liberalization
movement of the economy. This has been adopted as the major policy shift by
the new administration of President Chun and stands in sharp contrast to
the government-led strategy of the previous administration.
V. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
5.01 In December 1983, the performance evaluation system was applied
to 24 GIEs on an experimental basis. It reviewed their operational results
for the first six months of 1983. In June 1984, evaluation was conducted
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for the same 24 GlEs for the results of the entire year of 1983, and in
June 1985, the second round of the performance evaluation was carried out
for 25 GIEs for the results of 1984. This section reviews the principles
used in developing the performance evaluation system, then examines the
chronological sequence of its implementation, and finally describes the
system's performance indicators.
A. Basic Principles Governing the Performance Evaluation System
5.02 When setting up the performance evaluation system in Korea,
efforts were made to respect the following basic principles to the extent
feasible: 8/
1. The performance of management should be evaluated, not that
of the company. For example, in a deficit-producing GIE, an
improvement in management efficiency can reduce losses.
Thus, management should be credited for such improvement.
2. Both the short-term and long-term performance of management
should be evaluated.
3. Evaluation should be limited only to the variables within
the control of management (e.g., when tariffs are beyond the
8/ " A New Direction Toward Autonomous and Responsible Management and
Performance Evaluation System of GIEs in Korea" (in Korean) August,
1984.
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control of GIEs, the impact of changing prices should be
excluded from the performance evaluation).
4. Evaluation should be based on public profitability and not
on private profitability. 9/
5.03 These principles except for number 4 above (i.e. public
profitability) seem to have been strictly adhered to when the two rounds of
performance evaluation were carried out in 1984 and 1985. One of the
weaknesses of the system, which has most often been cited by managers and
Evaluation Task Force members, was the uncertainty concerning the extent to
which public profitability measures could effectively reflect both the
effectiveness (i.e., the delivery of the goods and services of GIEs) and
the efficiency of management. Public profitability as defined now is
deemed to be only a very rough proxy for the theoretical measurement of
both the effectiveness of the company and efficiency of management.
Therefore, in some cases, private profitability or productivity was used in
the place of public profitability (see para. 5.08 below). The issue is
likely to receive high priority in the future research program of the
Special Task Force of the KDI.
9/ For the definition of public profitability, see the articles of Leroy
P. Jones, "Towards a Performance Evaluation Methodology...," and the
article of Dr. D. M. Song," "New Approach to the Performance
Evaluation of Management of GIEs" (in Korean), Seoul, KSI, 1983. Both
authors use the same definition of "public profitability."
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5.04 The evaluation cycle has two critical steps: (1) the process
resulting in agreement on the management targets and enterprise-specific
indicators (both quantitative and qualitative) and (2) the Task Force
evaluation, based on the annual management performance reports prepared and
submitted by the performance evaluation unit of each GIE. The reports
contain:
the statement of account settlement for the preceding fiscal year
(January 1 - December 31), accompanied by financial tables,
supporting documents, and other documents necessary to clarify
the contents of the account settlement;
supporting documents or data related to achievement of the
pre-agreed management objectives;
backup documents or data related to the enterprise-specific
quantitative indicators used; and
supporting documents or data related to the qualitative
indicators (i.e., long-term corporate strategy, R&D, and internal
control and Management Information System).
B. Implementation
5.05 A full cycle of the evaluation exercise takes almost two years
from the design of and agreement on the management objectives to the
publication of the final evaluation results in the mass media. It entails a
- 18 -
number of deliberations and feedbacks between the Government, GIEs and the
ad-hoc Task Force. For example, the 1985 round of the performance
evaluation of the 1984 operational results of GIEs proceeded as follows:
October 1983: With support of KDI staff, enterprise-specific
indicators of performance evaluation were prepared
by the Public Enterprise Evaluation Bureau acting as
Secretariat, and sent to GIEs for their
comments/suggestions.
December 1983: Both the enterprise-specific indicators and
management objectives of GIEs were agreed on by the
Secretariat and GIEs, following a series of
consultations with their respective technical and
sectoral ministries, which took account of sectoral
development policies and conseqient guidelines to
GIEs.
March 31, 1985: GIEs submitted to the Secretariat the annual
management performance reports on the operations of
the year 1984, accompanied by a statement of account
settlement and other requisite documents.
April 1985: The ad-hoc Management Evaluation Task Force was set
up and the Council nominated its members.
April-June 1985: The Task Force evaluated the performance of the
- 19 -
GIEs, based upon the reports and data received,
visits to GIEs, and discussions with government
officials, GIE managers, and planning officers.
June-July 1985: The Task Force reported its results to the Council,
which was followed by Council members' intensive
deliberations on the results, especially on the
results for the GIEs previously under their direct
authority. At the end of July, the Council reported
the results to the President of the Republic of
Korea, and they were published in the mass media.
5.06 The two rounds so far undertaken revealed two problems. For one,
making the indicators and management objectives final around December left
little or no time for GIEs to readjust, if necessary, their corporate plans
for the following year. Advancing the timing for the agreement on the
goals and indicators to June or July would be more workable. Another
problem is that the two-month evaluation period appears too tight for the
Task Force to undertake a full, in-depth performance evaluation of GIEs.
Many members recommend a longer period of time, for example, three or four
months.
C. Indicators of Performance Evaluation
5.07 The performance indicators used in the Korean system are selected
so as to measure the results of the year against the trends in recent years
- 20 -
as well as the degree of the achievement of pre-agreed management targets
for the year. Two kinds of performance indicators are used: quantitative
indicators which account for 70% of the final "score," of the GIE, and
qualitative indicators which account for 30%. (Annex III provides greater
detail on the scoring mechanism of the system.) Table 1 shows the
quantitative and qualitative indicators used for the 1984 evaluation of the
banking and manufacturing subsectors.
5.08 Quantitative Indicators: In most cases, the key indicator is
public profitability, or private profitability, or productivity, with a
weight of between 10% and 25%. In the 1985 evaluation, for example, public
profitability was used as the key indicator in six GIEs with an average
weight of 20%; private profitability, in twelve GIEs, with an average
weight of 10%; and labor productivity was used in six GIEs. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the concept of a single primary indicator is applicable
in Korea. This is strikingly different from Pakistan's scoring system,
where public profitability and private profitability enter for 50% and 20%
of the final score, respectively. 10/
10/ "World Bank Role in the Management of Public Sector Industries:
Pakistan Experience," 1984, p. 10.
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Table I
Key Indicators of Performance Evaluation
---- Subsectors--------
Indicators Manufacturing Banking
(weight in %) (weight in 9)
(A) Quantitative
1. Public profitability 20 °
2. Total deposits/No. of employees 0 10
3. Intermediate costs/Sales 10 °
4. Ratio of doubtful loans 0 10
5. Labor cost/Sales 10 10
6. Equity/Deposits a 10
7. No. of injured people/One million tons of coal 5 °
8. Administrative costs/Earnings a
9. Total energy produced/Coal produced 5 °
10. Operating profits/Operating capital 0 10
l. Total coal mined/Total reserves 5 0
12. No. of consolidated companies 5 5
under administration
13. Administrative costs/Sales 5
14. Total amount of loans committed 0 10
15. Inventory/Sales 5 °
16. R&D expenditures/Administrative costs 0 5
17. R&D Expenditure/Sales 2 °
18. Equity + Fixed liabilities/Fixed assets 3 °
Subtotal (70) (70)
(B) Qualitative
1. Long-term corporate planning 10 3
2. R&D 10 6
3. MIS and internal control 10 15
4. Services quality 0 6
Subtotal (30) (30)
GRAND TOTAL (100) (100)
Sources:
"Performance Evaluation Reports of GIEs for the Operational Results of 1983," Seoul,
June, 1984.
"Performance Evaluation Reports of GIEs for the Operational Results of 1984," Seoul,
June, 1985.
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5.09 On the average, there are six or seven important other
quantitative indicators in Korea. As Table 1 shows, these indicators vary
from enterprise to enterprise in accordance with their specific activities.
5.10 Qualitative Indicators: Qualitative assessment is based on the
GIE's performance in three major fields: its medium and long-term
corporate strategy, its R&D activities, and its improvement of management
information and internal control systems, or of the quality of the GIEs'
services.
VI. Evaluation Results for 1983 and 1984 Operations
6.01 The final outcomes of the performance evaluation for the
operations of 1983 and 1984 (conducted in 1984 and 1985) are shown in Table
II.
6.02 The most interesting but also most difficult question drawn from
this table is whether the Korean GIE subsector was better or worse off in
1984 than in 1983. Does the composite (and not weighted) average score
have any useful meaning? If so, do the figures indicate a slight worsening
of management efficiency in GIEs in 1984 compared to 1983?
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Table II
Scores and Ranking (1983 and 1984)
1983 1984
Name of Enterprise Score Ranking Score Ranking
1. Korea Development Bank 92.49 (10) 91.59 ( 8 )
2. Small & Medium Industry Bank 91.45 (15) 91.59 ( 7 )
3. Citizens National Bank 94.45 ( 2) 92.22 ( 18 )
4. Korea Housing Bank 92.43 (11) 92.31 ( 5 )
5. Korea Stock Exchange 89.56 (19) 92.15 ( 6 )
6. Korea Security Printing & Minting Corp. 91.92 (12) 90.28 ( 17 )
7. Korea Electric Power Corp. 96.40 (1) 90.92 ( 13 )
8. Daihan Coal Corp. 94.07 (4) 91.15 ( 1 )
9. Korea Mining Promotion Corp. 91.71 (14) 90.47 ( 15 )
10. Korea Petroleum Development Corp. 91.74 (13) 92.48 ( 4 )
11. Korea Gen. Chem. Industry Corp. 88.97 (21) 93.55 ( 2 )
12. Korea Trade Promotion Corp. 89.28 (20) 89.60 ( 20 )
13. Korea Highway Corp. 94.12 (3 ) 91.24 ( 9 )
14. Korea National Housing Corp. 93.80 ( 5) 83.55 ( 24 )
15. Industrial Sites & Water Res. Development Corp. 90.12 (18) 90.74 ( 14 )
16. Korea Land Development Corp. 92.52 (8) 94.35 ( 1 )
17. Agricultural Promotion Corp. 93.38 (7) 90.94 ( 12 )
18. Agricultural & Fisheries Development Corp. 90.49 (17) 88.78 ( 22 )
19. Korea Telecoumunications Authority 93.43 (6) 91.20 ( 10 )
20. Korea National Tourism Corp. 88.85 (22) 89.13 ( 21 )
21. Korea Broadcasting System 92.50 (9) 90.44 ( 16 )
22. National Textbook Co., Ltd. 91.04 (16) 89.67 ( 19 )
23. Korea Overseas Development Corp. 85.91 (23) 85.37 ( 23 )
24. Korea Labor Welfare Corp. 84.01 (24) 92.72 ( 3 )
25. Korea Gas Corp. - () 82.13 (25 )
Average 91.45 90.26
Sources:
"Performance Evaluation Reports of GIEs for the Operational Results of 1983," Seoul,
June 1984.
"Performance Evaluation Reports of GIEs for the Operational Results of 1984," Seoul,
June 1985.
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Does the evaluation satisfy one of the general principles set by Professor
Leroy P. Jones--i.e., the indicators should show improvement or worsening
of the sector over time? 11/
6.03 Another interesting question concerns great changes in relative
rankings from 1983 to 1984. Only three of the GIEs ranked in the top ten
in 1983 finished in the top ten in 1984. Is this great variability
significant? We will have to wait several years to answer that question in
a satisfactory way.
6.04 Compared with their results of the previous year, four cases are
particularly interesting as detailed in Table II.
The Korea Labor Welfare Corporation rose from last place
(twenty-fourth) to third place. Annex IV examines this
puzzling--and even intriguing--case in detail.
The Korea General Chemical Industry Corporation rose from
twenty-first to second place, mostly due to the extraordinary
jump in the company's sales activities. 12/
11/ Leroy P. Jones, "Note on Current Status of Performance Evaluation...,"
op. cit., p. 4.
12/ Dr. Dae Hee Song admitted that the Korean system did not succeed to
completely separate out two factors contributing to the jump in
sales-- i.e., management improvement and changed macroeconomic
conditions.
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The Korea Electric Power Corporation slid from first to
thirteenth place. This case is interesting because the company's
ranking dropped in spite of its extraordinary profits. The fall
was due to the absence of an appropriate long-term corporate
development strategy and the lack of a convincing loan-repayment
schedule. The case seems to indicate the importance assigned to
qualitative indicators.
The Korea National Housing Corporation fell from fifth to
twenty-fourth place, due at least partly to the general recession
in the real estate market.
6.05 Another way of comparing the results of two distinct years is to
compare the number of GIEs by grades. Except for four cases, Table III
shows little change over time in the number of GIEs by grades.
Table III
Number of GIEs by Grades (1983 and 1984)
Scores Grades 1983 1984
1. 95-100 (outstanding) 1 0
2. 90-94 (excellent) 17 18
3. 85-89 (good) 5 5
4. 80-84 (satisfactory) 1 2
5. 75-79 (poor) 0 0
24 25
Source: "Performance Evaluation Reports for the Operational Results of 1984,"
Seoul, June, 1985.
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VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
7.01 Although the performance evaluation system has met with
extraordinary success, some major problems need to be solved quickly to
prevent potentially serious difficulties from emerging. This section first
discusses some of the system's achievements and the reasons for them, and
then examines its problems and how to resolve them.
A. The System's Achievements
Conscientious Personnel
7.02 After two rounds of trial and experimentation, the performance
evaluation system has now become a basic objective-oriented control system
for public enterprises. All the actors involved are playing the game
conscientiously.
7.03 The Enterprise Level: At the enterprise level, managers take the
system seriously, modify their behavior in response to the signals of the
system, and in most cases, generally use the criteria for performance
evaluation as the "Bible" management. More often than not, the Boards of
Directors also give special attention to those indicators when making
policy decisions . All employees, from the president down, are anxious to
earn high scores in the performance ranking. Most of the GIEs have
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established their own internal units of performance evaluation, with a view
toward strengthening their ability to carry out the government guidelines
and improving their corporate planning and internal control. The units are
generally staffed with the best personnel of the company who are called on
to play two critical roles: as negotiators with the government as well as
planners of the corporate strategy. This conscientiousness is only
logical, since the GIEs have to satisfy the government, which determines
their continued flow of resources. But the question remains whether using
the system will lead to an overall, perceptible improvement in sectoral
performance.
7.04 The Government Level: At the government level, the staff members
of the Public Enterprise Evaluation Bureau in the Economic Planning Board
realize that the system's impact has exceeded all expectations. They are
therefore convinced that since the system works, the signals provided by
the indicators must be "technically correct" so as to lead public
enterprises to socially and economically desirable behaviors and targets.
Thus, now that the system works, the technical issue of how to get the
indicators right and tailored to the specifics of each GIE becomes
critical. Indeed, several GIEs have already complained that the
enterprise-specificity of the indicators is not up to their expectations
and that, for instance, the non-commercial objectives of their companies
were not properly captured in the indicators. Partly in response to this
challenging issue, the Public Enterprise Evaluation Bureau has recently
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strengthened its staff from 12 to 20, and the Chief of the First Division
of the Bureau has just returned from a one-year training mission in the
U.S. As already mentioned, a Special Task Force was established last March
in KDI in order to serve as a think-tank for the Bureau over the next two
years.
7.05 Sector/Technical Ministries: The third set of actors -- i.e.,
sectoral/technical ministries -- are encouraged to continue to stay away
from direct interference in GIEs. They are directed to pass their
guidelines on sectoral policies and orientations to GIE managements only
indirectly or through intensive discussions when setting the management
objectives during the first stage of the performance evaluation process.
7.06 Ad Hoc Task Force: As the last-but-not-least players, the
experts of the ad hoc task force are the first to recognize that the
overwhelming impact of the system took them by surprise. They claim that
the present system should be replaced quickly by a permanent core of
experts with better skills and more time available to improve the
professionalism of the task force. However, they do not think that
performance evaluation should be undertaken exclusively by the staff of
the Bureau in the Economic Planning Board or only with limited
participation of private experts.
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B. Realization of Management Act's Goals
7.07 To what extent has the performance evaluation system so far
achieved the purposes set forth in the Management Act? The answer must
cover management accountability, management autonomy, and positive
contribution to the nation's economy.
7.08 Management Accountability: Even before the introduction of
performance evaluation, managers of GIEs in Korea compared favorably with
those of most developing (and even developed) countries in terms of their
heightened accountability for enterprise results. The new system clearly
has strengthened the consciousness of accountability in the minds of
managers.
7.09 Management Autonomy: While detailed assessment varies according
to the actors,it is generally agreed that management autonomy has been
increased under the system, especially as regards control over several key
actions such as budgeting, procurement, and personnel policy. As a result,
the pressure or interference from sectoral ministries on day-to-day
management has virtually been eliminated or reduced to the bare minimum for
most GIEs.
7.10 Positive Contribution to the Nation's Economy: The question of
whether the performance evaluation system has actually increased the
efficiency and effectiveness of GIEs cannot yet be answered. Indeed, no
indications or data exist showing any actual improvement or worsening of
the nation's economy attributable to the performance evaluation system.
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According to Dr. Dae Hee Song of KDI, this is because no attempt was made
to calculate the net contribution of the new system to the economy,
although it could have been done, albeit with some technical difficulties.
7.11 A very rough indication would be the increase in the "nominal"
operating surplus of the subsector from 400 billion won (US$ 530 million)
in 1983 to 600 billion won (US$ 750 million)--about a 40% rise. Obviously,
some of this was due to general price increases (although the inflation
rate was kept at about 4% during the period) and to improved macroeconomic
conditions. Moreover, this increase is in the "operating" surplus and not
in public profits, as noted earlier.
7.12 Moreover, Dr Dae Hee Song claims that the positive contribution
to the economy of the new system should be felt in the changes in the
perception of management function by GIE managers. Under the performance
evaluation system, GIE managers have become much more cost-conscious and
efficiency-oriented than before, and these changes will translate in the
future into a net gain of the economy. This second factor may be much more
important in increasing the efficiency of the economy in the long run.
Therefore, because the whole purpose of the system is to maximize the
return under given costs or to minimize costs for a given level of benefit,
gauging and quantifying, if possible, the net impact of the performance
evaluation system on the nation's economy deserves particular attention.
The Special Task Force should take this issue up in its research program.
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C. Reasons for the System's Success
7.13 Why does the system work in Korea? We believe the answer lies in
a number of factors.
7.14 High Degree of Political Commitment: The most important factor
in the system's success is the high degree of political commitment. This
commitment is all the more critical in a country like Korea where
government leadership is the greatest driving force for economic growth.
From the outset, the performance evaluation system has enjoyed the strong
support of the President of the Republic of Korea, the Deputy Prime
Minister (former alternate Executive Director to the World Bank), and the
Director of Performance Evaluation Bureau in EPB, and the total devotion
of Dr. Dae Hee Song, KDI, who has been not only the intellectual instigator
of the system, but also an excellent campaigner to convince GIE managers
and technical ministries of the utility of the system. Without his
perseverance, competence, and objectivity, it is doubtful that the system
could have received such wide acceptance from GIEs and the government in
such a short period of time.
7.15 GIE's Receptiveness to Performance-Based Incentives: The high
receptiveness of GIEs to the system's performance-based incentives (rewards
and sanctions) is the second most important explanation for the system's
success. Outstanding performance within the system has taken on a certain
social status which gives it immense influence on the behavior of Koreans.
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7.16 The pecuniary reward is the "extra bonus" determined by the
ranking: outstanding firms receive a sum equivalent to three month's
"extra" salary/wages; excellent firms, two and half months; good firms, two
months; satisfactory firms, 2 1/2 months, and even poor firms, one month.
No consensus exists on whether the differentials of "extra bonus" as they
are now constituted provide sufficient motivation to drive management and
employees toward better results: some people think they are, whereas
others believe the differences are not terribly significant. We believe
that for Korean workers, especially for those at the bottom of the salary
scale, the differential between three month's and one month's extra bonus
is sufficient motivation.
7.17 However, what is really important is the nonmaterial incentive or
sanction provided by the system. Public recognition is a powerful
motivating force in Korea. As an important element in group psychology,
public recognition may exert an immense influence on the behavioral changes
of Koreans. A respectable performance is all the more critical because of
the personal interest of the President of the Republic and wide publication
of the evaluation results in the mass media. For example, after the Korea
Labor Welfare Corporation made an extraordinary jump in efficiency
improvement from last place (twenty-fourth) in 1983 to second place in
1984, its president was promoted in July 1985 to be Deputy Minister of
Labor.
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7.18 Other Factors: Other factors that have contributed to the
system's success include the relatively simple data requirements of the
system; the preexisting absorptive capacity of GIEs which have long had
highly qualified manpower; the proven professionalism, neutrality and
devotion of the private experts of the task force; the ready disposition of
Koreans toward the relative ranking system because of their early exposure
to highly competitive entrance examinations; and demonstrated flexibility
in setting enterprise-specific indicators and management objectives.
D. Problems with the System and Proposed Solutions
7.19 Despite its remarkable success, the system still has a number of
serious problems. Unless proper action is quickly taken, they could lead
to collapse of the system or to costly distortions of GIEs.
7.20 Imprecise Indicators of Performance: The most serious problem is
that the system needs more appropriate enterprise-specific, comprehensive,
and nonduplicative criteria. Professor Leroy P. Jones in "Note on Current
Status of Performance Evaluation of Public Enterprises in Korea" provides
an excellent analysis of the technical problems facing the Korean system.
He argues that the system has two serious technical defects as follows.
7.21 "The single most serious defect in the existing system is that
criterion values are set in a way which violates the principle of fairness
to the enterprise in the sense that changes in demand affect public
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profitability." The suggested solution to this deficiency is to set a
demand-dependent schedule of targets.
7.22 In addition, "there is the problem of duplication in the current
set of indicators as demonstrated in the case of Dae Han Coal Corporation
(and many other GIEs)." Professor Jones has proposed excluding duplicative
indicators from the final evaluation system. While we generally agree with
Professor Jones, KDI staff and government officials in the Economic
Planning board do not. They believe that a single indicator such as public
or private profitability alone cannot measure management efficiency and
effectiveness. Other indicators should be used even at the risk of some of
them being duplicative. In their opinion, the question of the duplication
of indicators boils down in the last analysis, to the relative weight --
explicit or implicit--of various indicators. In the Korean system, the
duplication results in assigning implicit and uncalculated weights to some
indicators, which consequently may have greater weights than explicitly
specified. However, the experts in KDI and EPB think that such implicit
weights are not so important as to significantly distort the assessment of
the performance of GIEs.
7.23 Another reason that argues for using several indicators of equal
weight rather than a single dominating indicator (e.g., Pakistan's use of
public profitability with 50% weight) is that GIE managers are more willing
to accept a set of several indicators, rather than just one or two
indicators, to evaluate their performance. Rightly or wrongly, they
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believe that the potential benefits or damages of the evaluation results
for their company could be minimized with a set of various indicators of
equal importance, rather than with one or two overwhelming indicators.
That argument has actually been advanced on several occasions by many
managers of GIEs during the evaluation process of the 1985 round. This
question of duplicative indicators will receive top priority in the
research program of the KDI-located Special Task force.
7.24 Suboptimal Data Collection and Analysis: The management
information systems used in the evaluations need further standardization
and computerization to strengthen the reliability and efficiency of data
collection and analysis. The Special Task Force is now working on this
problem. It expects that beginning in 1987, the performance of GIEs will
be evaluated on the basis of standardized and computerized data collection
and analysis.
7.25 Excessive Competition among GIEs: There seems to be too much
competition "pressure" among GIEs for a better score. This may result in
wasted time and energy with little or no improvement in a GIEs efficiency.
Evaluating GIEs every other year, instead of every year, may be a workable
solution.
7.26 Lackluster Performance by Board of Directors: The functioning of
the GIEs Boards of Directors is far from satisfactory. From the
institutional reform point of view, their failure as a meaningful and
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useful body (whether executive or advisory) is a serious blow to the
system. At this time, the Board is neither a decision-making body nor an
executive body. The two-tier management system advocated under the
Management Act has turned out to be an empty concept, and a solution needs
to be found on whether the Board should be a real decision-maker, an
executive body or a simple formality. The task force has identified this
issue as one of its top research priorities. However, few people in Korea
think that a workable solution can be found soon. Some believe that the
status quo-- i.e., the Board doing no business at all-- may be the best
solution. (For details, see the article of Professor Thomas A. Mahoney,
"Observation on Management Practice Under the GIE Management Act," Owen
Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, December 1984).
7.27 Insufficient Emphasis on fundamental Policy Change: The Korean
system fails to produce fundamental policy shifts in GIEs. This is
because the evaluation of management performance is based upon the concept
of marginal and gradual improvement, rather than fundamental, abrupt
changes in a corporation's policy or directions. Actually, the problem is
probably exacerbated because the agreed-upon management objectives, which
at least in theory could incorporate fundamental policy shifts of the
sector, now account for only 15%-20% in the evaluation score and therefore
get limited attention from GIE managers. This is most obvious in the
sectors where technical changes are extremely rapid and comprehensive. For
example, Telecommunications Corporation of Korea was faulted for not having
its management objectives reflect sufficiently the drastic changes in
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policy directions advocated by the Ministry of Telecommunications. This
problem does not appear that serious in other subsectors, where shifts in
policies and directions are forthcoming more gradually. Therefore, if a
ministry intends to use a corporation under its sectoral authority as a
vehicle to implement a massive shift in its sectoral policy, the
performance evaluation system is not the most appropriate tool for that
purpose. A more direct way, such as creating a new GIE or modifying the
legal status of the GIE in question, might be more efficient.
7.28 Potential for bias: The task force members are said to be subject
to "pressure" for favoritism by GIE managers/planners and Board members. A
solution to this problem now under consideration is to reorganize the work
of the task force members. At present, each member works for two or three
GIEs and scores their overall performance. Instead, from now on, he will
be required to work on a limited number of indicators (whether qualitative
or quantitative) for all 25 GIEs. The new system will minimize the danger
of corruption (which has never been detected yet) and will strengthen both
the principle of division of labor and the professional competence of the
experts.
7.29 Inadequate Professional Expertise of Government Officials: There
is an increasingly urgent need for strengthening the professional expertise
and skills of government officials involved in matters related to
performance evaluation. No training program for government officials has
yet been elaborated. However, given the critical importance and urgency
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for the training of government staff, especially those working in the
Performance Evaluation Bureau in the Economic Planning Board, the special
task force should be requested to devise as soon as possible a short and
long term training program (both in-house and external).
VIII. LESSONS FOR FUTURE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMS
8.01 Officials considering introducing a performance evaluation system
for public enterprises in African countries and elsewhere may draw several
lessons from the Korean experience. To be successful, their systems should
incorporate the following guidelines:
o High level political leaders and ministries should show a
strong, consistent commitment to the system.
This commitment should be equally strong throughout the
government, in relevant academic circles, and in research
institutes.
o At the start, the system should be simple with crude
indicators and limited data requirements. The system can
then be refined.
o Training the key officials in government and enterprises who
will be responsible for running the system should be given
top priority.
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Devising adequate incentive and career development systems,
based upon performance evaluation, is critical. In
countries where public recognition or non-pecuniary rewards
and penalties do not play as critical a motivating force for
harder work, material incentive systems should be given
greater weight than in Korea.
A system that combines both evaluation and "monitoring"
appears to be more appropriate in African countries. The
question is how to avoid overwhelming enterprises with
excessive data and information requirements.
8.02 African countries, which suffer from a lack of qualified and
trained personnel in monitoring and evaluating the performance of their
PEs, may choose to rely on foreign experts at least in the short run. In
that case, it seems worthwhile to consider hiring consultants who have
practical experience in devising and implementing performance evaluation
systems in such developing countries as Pakistan and Korea.
Table I
KOREAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE BY IYPE (1983)*
Type of Public Characteristics Number of Employment Budget Sales (1982)
Enterprise Public Enterprises (thousands) (millions of USS) (millions of USS)
Government Government department type 5 80 4,574 2,735
Enterprises (Office of Monopoly, (28.1%) (22.3%) (13.5%)
Office of Railroad, etc.)
Government- Government holds at least 24 128 9,728 8,614
Invested 50% of stock (Korea (44.9%) (47.4%) (43.0%)
Enterprises Development Bank, Korea
Electric Power Corporation, etc.)
Subsidiary Indirect government investment 49 43 2,140 4,384
Companies of through government-invested (15.1%) (10.4%) (21.9%)
Government-invested enterprises
enterprises
Other Government holds less 7 34 4,074 4,300
Government- than 50% of stock (22.9%) (19.9%) (22.5%)
Backed
Enterprises
TOTAL 85 285 20,517 20,033
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
Source: Economic Planning Board.
TABLE 2
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT-INVESTED ENTERPRISES
EMPWYHENT PAID IN CAPITAL BUDGET PRIMARY SERVICE/PRODUCT EMPLOYMENT PAID IN CAPITAL BUDGET PRIMARY SERVICE/PRODUCT
(million U.S79T (million U.S.S)
Korea Highway 2,367 147 126 Planning, construction and Korea Development Bank 2,179 679 886 Long-term loans investment
Corporation management of expressway guarantees, int'l banking
Korea Housing 2,420 189 877 Low-income houaing Small and Medium 7,380 178 358 Providing credit guarantees,
Corporation construction Industry Bank loana, and discounts to
small & medium industries
Industry Site and 1,227 461 128 Industry site and special Citizens National 9,641 25 449 Promoting household savings,
Water Resource regional development expanding financing to small
Development Corporation enterprisea & low income groups
Korea Land Promotion 875 252 269 Land acquisition and supply Korea Housing Bank 6,415 25 277 Fund-generation financing for
Corporation both public and private housing
sectors
Agriculture Promotion 2,196 12 180 Irrigation development Korea Securities Exchange 348 4 9 Regulations of securities sales
Corporation land reclamation review of new stock offering
Agriculture and Fishery 448 13 16 Assisting processing and Korea Electric Power 22,372 2,060 3,622 Electrical source development 4,
Development Corporation marketing distribution of Corporation and electricity generation -
agricultural and fishery
products, research
Korea Telecomunication 42,883 2,338 1,504 Dredging and filling Korea Coal Corporation 14,247 83 383 Coal production
Authority
Labor Welfare Corporation 1,153 25 18 Providing industrial Korea Integrated Chemical Urea and chemical fertilizer
accident insurance, industrial Stock Company 955 114 126 production
safety/health-related services.
Korea Trade Promotion 509 1 30 Overseas marketing and Government Printing Office 561 11 37 Textbook production and supply
Corporation information service
Korea Tourism Corporation 476 28 57 Tourism Government Mint 3,209 9 69 National mint
Korea Broadcasting System 5,080 93 250 Radio and TV broadcasting Korea Mining Promotion 406 67 23 Technical guidance, mine assess-
service Corporation ment and mineral credit financ-
ing.
Overseas Development Overseas labor supply Petroleum Development Petroleum resource exploration
Corporation 225 1 5 service Corporation 329 29 27 and development, domestic oil
supply and demand stabilization
Total 127,721 6,865 9,728
Source: Dae Hee Song, "New Policy Direction..." p. 30, Appendix 1.
- 42 -
The Scoring System
1. The scoring mechanism of the Korean performance evaluation system
can be described as follows:
(a) There are two methods to set quantitative indicators: one
is to set them by projecting 5-6 year trends as the
performance basis and then using standard deviations to set
the magnitudes of the year for above- and below- standard
classifications. Concretely, the score of the year is
calculated as follows:
(i) calculate the "actual" value of the year;
(ii) calculate the 5-6 year trend value;
(iii) calculate the standard deviations of the "actual"
value over the trend value and classify them into the
following 5 categories according to probabilities:
outstanding, excellent, good, satisfactory, and poor
and the nominal distribution of probabilities as
follows:
Good_
ptisfactory Excellent 
roor | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Outstandin\
,5 p10 P 0 70 90 p95
11 11 i f 1I 1 I II
-1.645 -1.282 -0.526 -0.526 1.282 1.645
(iv) Calculate the scores according to the following formula:
Categories Scores
Actual value-POutstanding - 95 + 2.5 x 90
p p95 - 90
Excellent - 90 + 5 xActual value-P70
90 - 70
Actual value-PGood - 85 + 5 x 30
70 - 30
Actual value-P 0Satisfactory - 80 + 5 x _ActualvaluP 10
30 - 10
p p
10 - 5
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(b) A second way to set quantitative indicators is by using
distribution values in the past 5 years (instead of the
trend value.)
(i) standard value y a+4m+b
6 (b-a)2
standard deviation s =
36
where a: the lowest actual value in the past 5 years
b: the highest actual value in the past 5 years
m: actual value of the year preceeding the evaluation
(ii) The classification of distribution values into 5
categories and the scoring system are the same as in
the trend method.
(c) The score of the achievement of agreed-upon management
targets (both qualitative and quantitative) is made as
follows:
Achievement degree Score
100% and plus 100
95% - 99% 90
90% - 94% 85
85% - 89% 80
85% and less 75
(d) The qualitative indicators related to corporate strategy, R
and D, and MIS improvement are assessed in three categories:
Categories Score
High 97.5
Middle 87.5
Low 77.5
(2) The overall score of the performance of a GIE is obtained by
adding all the scores of indicators multiplied by their
respective weights and is classified as follows:
Categories Score
Outstanding 95-100
Excellent 90-94
Good 85-89
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Satisfactory 80-84
Poor 75-79
(3) For illustrative purposes, let's take the first year (1983)
results of the Dae Han Coal Corporation (the third biggest GIE
after Korea Telecommunication Authority and Korea Electric Power
Corporation).
Indicators Method Trend/ Value Actual Value Categories Score Weight Weighted Score
1. Public 5 year 8.14% 5.80% Excellent 94.06 20% 18.81
profitability trend
2. Labor cost 5 year 73.35% 72.02% Outstanding 95.00 10% 9.50
/sales trend
3. Administra- 3 year 1.44% 1.49% Satisfactory 81.20 5% 4.06
tive cost/ distribution
sales
4.
5. ---- - - -
12.R & D Middle 87.50 10% 8.75
Total _ 100%
Source: "Mamnal for Management Performance Evaluation of GIEs, 1985" Seoul, 1984
Scoring/GHAI/KB33
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Annex IV
A Case Study: Korea Labor Welfare Corporation
Established on December 28, 1979, Korea Labor Welfare Corporation
is a GIE responsible for promoting the welfare of workmen. Its major
functions include:
establishment and management of facilities for compensating
victims of industrial accidents;
o projects related to industrial safety and health;
° labor welfare promotion projects; and
o governmental consignment projects related to labor welfare.
The Corporation operates seven industrial-accident-victim
hospitals with some 1,000 beds and other industrial welfare facilities,
including an Industrial Rehabilitation Center with 300 beds available. It
has 1,347 personnel, including some 100 doctors, 470 nurses and 200 office
personnel. The total budget for 1985 amounts to 26 billion won (or US$30
million), of which 87% goes for medical operations and 4.5% for welfare
operations.
Ranked in the last place (twenty-fourth) in the 1984 evaluation,
the Corporation rose to second place in the 1985 evaluation. Many people
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think that most of the credit for the extraordinary improvement should go
to the Corporation's President who devoted all his energy and efforts to
improve management through a series of innovative and sometimes painful
reform measures.
Following is a summary of the major categories of reform measures
undertaken during calendar year 1984. (For details, see the brochure (in
Korean) entitled "The Performance Evaluation and Improvement of Management
of Korea Labor Welfare Corporation, 1985.")
o Efforts to increase the number of patients accepted: (One of
the key indicators of performance evaluation is the ratio of
total costs of medical examination and treatment over the
number of patients accepted.)
0 Efforts to improve the efficiency of internal control:
-- creation of a performance evaluation unit; and
introduction of performance-based incentive and
career-development systems.
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Efforts for reorganization:
trimming and simplification of the internal
organization; and
merge/fusion/liquidation of various committees from 90
to 57.
° Efforts to improve personnel policy:
layoff of redundant manpower (44 personnel);
in-house and abroad training programs;
introduction of the term system (three years at
maximum) for the executive members; and
introduction of the "pool" system of manpower between
the central headquarters and peripheral hospitals.
Efforts to rationalize the budget process:
introduction of the zero-base budget system; and
creation of the cost-reduction program, for example,
self-supply of patient's clothes, foods or office
appliances, such as printing (actual reduction of 251
million won over the 1984 budget).
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o Efforts for better procurement/contract:
rationalization of procurement system of materials,
including the centralized (instead of the
decentralized) system of procurement.
a Other efforts:
-- case studies of welfare corporations in other countries
(especially in Japan);
-- in-depth study on the long-term strategy of the company
(done by the KDI); and
-- simplification of and reduction in frequency of
regular "reporting" within the company.
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